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Abstract: Information and Communication Technology (ICT) has become a major driver 
of investment and growth in OECD countries. The analysis puts the focus on key 
developments in the ICT sector and international outsourcing dynamics as well as the 
specific role of ICT in the financial sector. One can show that the expansion of ICT is not 
only contributing to national and international outsourcing but to insourcing as well. 
Furthermore, ICT affects regional integration. In the context of a modified Dornbusch 
model – including foreign direct investment – the impact of ICT on output and the 
exchange rate are discussed. The risk of overshooting in foreign exchange markets is likely 





Zusammenfassung:  Die Informations- und Kommunikationstechnologie (IKT) is a 
wesentlicher Treiber für Investitionen und Wirtschaftswachstum in den OECD Ländern 
geworden. Die Analyse behandelt Schlüsselentwicklungen im IKT-Sektor und thematisiert 
die internationale Outsourcing-Dynamik sowie die spezifische Rolle von IKT für den 
Finanzsektor. Man kann zeigen, dass die IKT-Expansion nicht nur zu nationalem und 
internationalem Outsourcing führt, sondern auch zu Insourcing. IKT beeinflusst auch die 
regionale Integration. Im Kontext eines modifizierten Dornbusch-Modells wird der 
Einfluss – bei Berücksichtigung der Rolle von Direktinvestitionen – auf Produktion und 
Wechselkurs diskutiert. Das Risiko eines Overshooting im Devisenmarkt dürfte durch die 
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1.  Introduction 
The sector of information and communication technology (ICT) is a major driver of the 
economy in the 21
st century. ICT represents a rising share of investment and R&D in 
OECD countries and thus is of particular relevance for growth and economic 
competitiveness. From a EU25 perspective, it also is crucial to note that the expansion of 
ICT is associated with the growth of a networked society in which the flow of information 
and technology on the one hand is accelerating; at the same time both ICT and digital 
networking facilitate international outsourcing and offshoring. Offshoring involves foreign 
direct investment while international outsourcing occurs through trade and arm’s length 
market transactions. 
In the context of the Lisbon Agenda of the European Community, the growth-
enhancing aspect of ICT is quite important; at the same time one may anticipate impulses 
for: 
•  Structural change: as the relative price of ICT capital goods is expected to continue 
to fall sectors using ICT capital will intensively expand. 
•  Shifts in employment demand: as skilled labor is complementary to ICT capital the 
demand for skilled labor will rise while the relative demand for unskilled labor will 
fall; this will require transitorily higher wage differentials and indeed could imply 
that wages of unskilled workers will have to fall if rising unemployment rates are 
to be avoided.  
•  Digital education: In the European Learning Space – as defined by the Community 
– there will be new opportunities to embark upon digital learning/teaching projects 
which could be quite useful in meeting key challenges in the field of human capital 
building and productivity growth in an ageing EU society. 
•  Enhanced economic globalization through both trade and foreign direct investment 
as trading costs – relevant for international outsourcing – are reduced in a digitally 
networked economy on the one hand; on the other hand firm-internal transaction 
costs are falling due to modern ICT so that larger multinational companies can be 
established in larger international markets. The share of intra-company trade might 
rise in this context – reflecting increased offshoring – although the pressure for 
national and international outsourcing is a counter-balancing effect. 
•  The increasing use of ICT facilitates the creation, processing and storing of 
information, which should affect adjustment parameters in goods markets and 
financial markets; for example, the learning speed in the formation of exchange 
rate expectations might increase and information about international availability of 
liquid assets could become more easily accessible so that the interest elasticity in 
the demand for money would rise – both parameters are relevant in the Dornbusch 
model with its focus on the problem of exchange rate overshooting. 
Many economists have classified ICT as a general purpose technology which affects 
productivity in almost all sectors as the use of ICT is associated with considerable 
technological progress and facilitates innovation dynamics in many sectors. HEMPELL 
(2006) has emphasized that the concept of ICT as an “enabling technology” means that  
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productivity increases are contingent on adequate company strategies and complementary 
efforts – this includes an impulse for human capital formation, as skilled labor is 
complementary to ICT investment. The implication is that the diffusion of ICT will 
increase the trend growth rate in many countries. At the same time, one must consider the 
potential problem that ICT capital accumulation will primarily increase the demand for 
skilled labor and thus could bring about a relative rise in the skill premium in wages. If the 
wages of unskilled labor were insufficiently flexible (and if progress is labor-augmenting 
with respect to unskilled labor), a rising unemployment rate among unskilled workers 
might result in the medium term. However, as regards the long run, one should also 
consider the challenge of retraining and education, as the share of unskilled workers in 
Europe – or the US – is not exogenous. This then, points to the issue of adequate policies, 
including tax policies that stimulate human capital formation and retraining. 
The share of high technology imports (with the degree of technological sophistication 
assumed to correspond to skill intensity) in global imports increased from 18% in 1992 to 
22.4% in 2003 – of which ICT represented 12.8% and 17.9%, respectively; the share of 
medium-high technology trade remained rather stable at around 37% (ECFIN, 2005, p.63). 
If one classifies global trade rather according to factor intensity, one finds that the share of 
R&D intensive goods has increased in global trade: the share of easy to imitate research 
goods stood at 14.3% in 1992, but at 18.3% in 2003. The share of difficult to imitate 
research goods was 24.6% in 1992 and 26.2% in 2003. 
ICT goods production is not only technology intensive, it is also largely scale intensive 
so that the creation of the (enlarged) EU single market should reinforce the 
competitiveness of EU firms in this sector. One may measure the change in international 
competitiveness by regional or global indicators of revealed comparative advantage 
(RCA). Traditionally the Balassa-Samuelson RCA is used for RCA analysis where the 
definition of traditional RCA puts the focus on the sectoral export-import ratio relative to 
the aggregate export-import ratio. In this perspective, a ratio above unity indicates a 
comparative advantage (“positive specialization”). This indicator might be used in a trade-
balance corrected form which takes into account any bias related to an aggregate surplus or 
deficit position (see, e.g., ECFIN, 2005). Alternatively one can focus on modified RCA, 
which is the ratio of sectoral exports to aggregate exports of country i relative to the same 
ratio for a benchmarking group of countries in the same target market (e.g., EU15 market). 
This concept has been developed by BORBÉLY (2005) who compares EU accession 
countries’ normal sectoral export performance with various groups of sectors (e.g., labor 
intensive or technology intensive) in the EU15 market. Instead of focusing on the EU15 
market, one could focus on the world market. Due to data problems, however, the more 
narrow EU15 single market is often considered.  
While it is true that each country naturally is positively specialized in some sectors and 
negatively specialized in other sectors, one should note that the type of positive 
specialization is crucial with respect to economic growth, as was shown for the EU15 by 
JUNGMITTAG (2004; 2006):  
•  If a country is positively specialized in high-technology sectors (“Ricardian 
specialization”), this will significantly contribute to economic growth.   
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•  Smithian specialization naturally will occur in the process of competition and trade 
in open economies, but it does not contribute to growth in EU15 countries. One 
should not rule out that in certain manufacturing sectors import competition could 
be a particular driver for productivity growth. (For positive evidence in the case of 
the US but negative for the case of Germany, see MANN, 2000.)  
The EU Economy 2005 Review (ECFIN, 2005) emphasizes several important 
developments: 
•  there is a growing global tendency towards trade in intermediate products and 
hence to flexible international networked production 
•  the EU’s trade position is rather weak in ICT, which is considered a high-
technology sector; based on traditional RCA and with respect to the world market 
the EU15 has structural deficits in five of the 20 export groups which grow most 
quickly among the 3-digit product classification groups. In the five negative RCA 
sectors of the EU15, there are three ICT related industries (semiconductors, 
computers, parts and accessories for computers) as well as clothing and electrical 
machinery (ECFIN, 2005, p. 73). East Asian countries – including China and India 
– have gained considerable market shares in ICT. 
•  Across all sectors the EU(15) has lost ground in low- and medium-quality products 
but not in the top-of-the-range product groups; upmarket products accounted at the 
beginning of the 21
st century for 48% of EU15 exports, for 52% of exports in the 
case of Japan and for 41% of exports in the case of the US (ECFIN, 2005, p. 74) 
•  ICT is facilitating the international fragmentation of the value-added chain, namely 
both in the manufacturing industry and services sector. The latter thus also raises 
new challenges for skilled labor (MANN, 2003) which so far has been under rather 
limited pressure from outsourcing and offshoring. The European Commission 
notes (ECFIN, 2005, p. 15): “ICT is affecting production structures: International 
specialization according to Ricardo’s comparative advantage applies increasingly 
to segments of the product cycle rather than to complete products. The growing 
share of part and components in world trade…indicates the increasing 
fragmentation of manufacturing production. ICT has been a fundamental 
contributor to the dramatically changed tradability of goods and 
services…Services are affected: While modularity and fragmentation of 
manufacturing production is not a new phenomenon, it is now also applied to 
services. Many jobs previously considered as non-tradable are suddenly exposed to 
international competition and may risk being dislocated.” 
The fact that tradability has increased implies that the costs of international fragmentation 
have fallen, which has to be further explored in basic models of fragmentation. To the 
extent that services become more tradable – see the case of digital products and services – 
one may also expect economies of scale to become more important in the services sector. 
Internationalization of industries is a consistent phenomenon of economic globalization 
which mainly suggests a rising role for both foreign direct investment and international 
trade, particularly since the expansion of the internet has increased the digital cross-border  
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diffusion of information and knowledge. Globalization and the above described 
developments have to be explained in theoretical terms, namely 
•  in order to get a better understanding of the international and national economic 
dynamics  
•  to develop rational policy options with the aim of increasing economic welfare, 
maintaining economic stability and reinforcing cooperation among partners in the 
EU integration club as well as outside the EU. 
Globalization also concerns the aspect that more and more countries have opened up for 
trade and capital flows, which in turn has facilitated international outsourcing and trade 
with intermediate products on the one hand and with differentiated final products on the 
other, the latter being a crucial part of intra-industrial trade. In this perspective, the 
expansion of ICT and accumulation of ICT capital in Europe is crucial as it  
•  helps to create new markets and thus stimulates product cycle trade in ICT goods  
•  affects relative factor abundance (as measured by the share of ICT-capital in 
overall capital) and thus stimulates internationalization of goods and services along 
the lines of a modified Heckscher-Ohlin approach; countries which have relatively 
high ICT capital intensities will specialize in ICT-capital-intensive goods and 
record high shares of the respective export category 
•  creates new opportunities for outsourcing at the national level and the international 
level; international outsourcing is stimulated relatively strongly in industries with 
opportunities for digital outsourcing, since the liberalization of 
telecommunications markets in EU15 after 1998 has brought with it the steepest 
fall in prices in international telecommunications (as regards accession countries 
there are several special developments, including transition periods to full 
international liberalization in telecommunications which imply that digital 
international outsourcing opportunities will improve in EU25/Eastern European 
accession countries more slowly than in EU15); national long distance prices have 
also fallen considerably, while the decline of local prices was modest in the first 
stage of liberalization. 
•  ICT reduces firm internal transaction costs and thus facilitates management in 
large companies which in turn implies new opportunities for foreign direct 
investment (FDI); in the context of product cycle trade FDI can be expected to 
play a particularly strong role in scale intensive goods. The new tendencies 
towards fragmentation – facilitated by ICT – allow even for the possibility to 
relocate production of high-technology components so that offshoring-dynamics 
increase. To the extent that ICT-expansion creates larger markets, the typical 
positive correlation between market size and firm size also implies increased FDI 
and offshoring.  
From an EU15 perspective, EU eastern enlargement has strongly risen interest in off-
shoring – defined as international outsourcing involving foreign direct investment – as new 
low-wage countries have entered the EU single market. Assuming that not only cheap 
unskilled labor in eastern Europe is found but also relatively cheap skilled labor is 
available in accession countries, one may anticipate considerable pressure for off-shoring.  
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If there is off-shoring through a subsidiary abroad, rising management costs associated 
with a more complex (international) organization of the respective multinational company 
must be more than offset by a cost advantage in production or the provision of services – 
or by improved access to the host country markets. If there is off-shoring to a foreign firm 
there will be quality uncertainties, so that the cost savings should more than offset the 
increasing cost of quality verification in the buying of intermediate inputs of uncertain 
quality.  
Policymakers are to some extent worried that international outsourcing could lead to 
considerable job losses. This fear is not only relevant with respect to (ICT) manufacturing 
but also with respect to services which typically are more skill-intensive than the 
manufacturing industry. Thus international outsourcing of services could mean that jobs 
requiring skilled labor (representing relatively high wages and incomes) may be relocated 
internationally. Taking into account that a considerable share of international outsourcing 
does indeed improve the global competitiveness of EU firms – say EU software firms 
outsourcing to Asia so that cost competitiveness of EU firms in US markets is improved – 
the basic equation could reveal that in a triangular trading perspective, one should not 
worry about outsourcing. The situation with ICT, however, is special to some extent since 
the ICT sector is a Schumpeterian sector with high innovation dynamics. Between 15-25% 
of patents from firms in leading EU countries concern the ICT sector in the early 21st 
century. 
Section 2 takes a look at ICT characteristics and international outsourcing dynamics on 
the one hand and on ICT on the other to get a better understanding of the role of ICT for 
Europe. Section 3 considers the role of ICT and foreign direct investment in the context of 
a modified Dornbusch model to offer a better idea about the nature of overshooting 
problems in a digital economy with ICT. Section 4 puts the focus on some regulatory 
policy issues and key aspects of life-long learning in the EU.  
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2.  Economic Development, Adjustment and Outsourcing 
2.1  Traits of the ICT Sector and Economic Dynamics 
The ICT sector has been part and parcel of the international outsourcing process. ICT 
sector dynamics have broad economic significance; they affect many sectors, as so many 
use ICT products or ICT services, which implies strong competition and in turn stimulates 
the cost-cutting reorganization of industries and national or international outsourcing 
dynamics – part of which concerns the ICT sector itself. Moreover, one may expect four 
impulses for rising internationalization in the sense of growing trade: 
•  the ICT sector is an expanding field in its own right, as novel digital products and 
services are created in a dynamic networked world economy; the 
internationalization of the ICT sector thus has to be analyzed not in the least from 
the perspective of the product cycle trade approach (VERNON, 1966); a special 
ICT issue concerns the question as to whether ICT contributes to an accelerated 
innovation race, possibly induced through faster diffusion of new knowledge in an 
increasingly networked world economy 
•  part of the ICT sector (e.g., software, a sub-sector of digital services) is 
characterized by network effects, which amounts to a kind of unusual endogenous 
growth impulse coming from the demand side. To the extent that this raises both 
output and per capita income, one faces a trade creation effect 
•  since part of the ICT sector expansion amounts to cutting international transaction 
costs – relative to domestic transaction costs – there is an indirect trade creation 
effect which will influence not only the ICT sector itself but other sectors as well 
•  since ICT is particularly characterized by high R&D intensity and since in 
technology-based ownership specific advantages are considered as the basis for 
successful international investment, one should expect that expansion of the R&D 
sector will stimulate foreign direct investment. 
Since the 1990s information and communication technology (ICT) has been a major driver 
of economic growth in OECD countries. There is broad consensus in the literature that ICT 
production (mainly due to high rates of process innovations) is contributing to this growth. 
Moreover, there is also some support for the argument that ICT use contributes to increases 
in output (VAN ARK, 2001; AUDRETSCH/WELFENS, 2002 
BARFIELD/HEIDUK/WELFENS, 2003). There is considerable evidence that ICT plays 
an important role for the growth differential US vs. EU15: JORGENSON/STIROH (2000), 
COLECCHIA/SCHREYER (2002), OLINER/SICHEL (2002), STIROH (2001), and 
INKLAR ET AL. (2003) have argued that ICT production and the use of ICT (that is, 
cumulated ICT investment) are important drivers of productivity growth. More cautious 
about the link between ICT and growth is GORDON (2004). As regards Eastern Europe, 
VAN ARK/PIATKOWSKI (2004) find some evidence that ICT significantly affects 
productivity and output growth. WELFENS/PONDER (2003) and PONDER/MARKOVA 
(2005) have shown that Eastern European countries have considerably caught up in the 
field of telecommunications, however Russia lags behind EU accession countries.  
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Comparing the periods 1995-2000 to 1979-1995, the INKLAAR ET AL. analysis of labor 
productivity growth in the US and EU-4 finds a rise of 1.25 percentage points in the US 
and a fall of 0.27 points in the EU. The growth accounting estimates show that labor 
quality changes have reduced labor productivity in both the US and the EU-4. The 
employment reallocation effect in the US was positive at + 0.05 points, but in the EU-4 the 
figure was -0.06 points. ICT producing industries generated similar impacts on 
productivity growth in the US and the EU, namely 0.04 and 0.03 percentage points. As 
regards the impact of ICT-using industries, the EU did not reach even half the increase of 
the US which was 0.29 points, the main effect stemming from financial services (0.17 in 
the US; 0.02 in EU-4). Non-ICT capital deepening contributed to 0.08 points in the US and 
-.45 points in the EU. Total factor productivity contributed 0.79 points in the US, but only 
0.13 points in the EU-4. The impact from ICT producing industries was rather similar on 
both sides of the Atlantic (0.36 in the US vs. 0.24 in the EU), but in ICT using industries 
there were many larger differences; in particular wholesale trade, retail trade and financial 
services seem to be problem areas for Western Europe. Weak EU15 productivity increases 
and slow growth are all the more unsatisfactory, since Germany, France, Italy and Spain 
suffer from high unemployment rates and since slow growth from 2000 to 2005 seems to 
indicate that the ambitious goals of the EU Lisbon Agenda (aiming at higher growth and 
employment by 2010) will not be achieved. However, there is a range of reports from the 
European Commission which analyze the dynamics of the information society 
developments and suggest policy options for stimulating digital modernization in EU 
eastern accession countries (BOGDANOWICZ/CENTENO/BURGELMAN, 2004; 
BOGDANOWICZ//BURGELMAN/CENTENO/GOUROVA/CARAT, 2003; GOU-
ROVA/BURGELMAN/BOGDANOWICZ/HERRMANN, 2002). 
A growth accounting analysis by SAKELLARIS/VIJSELAAR (2005) for the Euro 
zone has tried to take into account the role of quality changes in capital formation and in 
output (unfortunately this SOLOW-type growth accounting exercise does not consider 
labor quality aspects – and the analysis might suffer from methodological problems since 
focus is on the Euro zone with its high unemployment figures, which would rather suggest 
relying on data envelopment analysis). This leads to an upward correction of output growth 
figures for 1982-1990 and for 1991-2000 by about 0.5 percentage points in both periods. 
The role of capital growth, based on quality adjusted figures, rises by 0.33 in the first 
period and by 0.45 points in the second period. Among the sub-categories IT hardware, 
software, communication equipment, other machinery and equipment, transport equipment 
and non residential construction, the combined contribution of IT hardware, software and 
communication equipment amounted to 0.26 percentage points in the first period and 0.2 
percentage points in the second period (reflecting a modest upward revision from quality-
unadjusted figures; as regards software, quality adjustment brought no change in the 
assessment). Total factor productivity growth accounted for 2.2 points in the first period 
and 1.46 in the second period which had shown a deceleration of growth (2.34 % growth of 
GDP compared to 2.97% in the first period; both quality-adjusted figures are 0.6 
percentage points higher than the figures without quality adjustment). The increase in total 
factor productivity growth is decomposed in equipment and software as well as “rest”; 
equipment contributed 0.59 percentage points in the first period and 0.63 percentage points 
in the second period. This suggests that ICT dynamics have a triple importance for the 
Euro zone as well as for other countries:  
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•  quality adjustment of output; 
•  contribution to capital growth; 
•  growth of total factor productivity growth; 
In the 1990s, the overall contribution to growth in leading OECD countries was – 
according to OECD figures – between 0.5 and 0.8 percentage points, which is rather 
impressive for a sector which hardly accounted for 10% of aggregate output at the 
beginning of the 21
st century (and for 15-35% of investment). ICT is a broad field which 
contains computers & software, telecommunications and modern digital services, all of 
which are inputs in every sector of the economy. ICT is also crucial for innovation since a 
rising share of R&D expenditures is accounted for by the ICT sector. Nevertheless one 
cannot argue that ICT expansion has stimulated growth in a rather homogeneous way 
across OECD countries, and indeed very few OECD countries have experienced a 
considerable increase in labor productivity or technological progress in the context of the 
growth of ICT. PILAT (2005) argues that only a few countries have witnessed an upsurge 
in labor or multi-factor productivity growth in those sectors that have invested most in 
ICT. Among the factors explaining this – according to PILAT – are differences in the 
countries’ respective uptake of ICT (OECD, 2003; 2004). ICT investment rose from less 
than 15% of total non-residential investment in the early 1980s to a range of 15-30% at the 
beginning of the 21
st century; the share of ICT investment was relatively high in the US, 
the UK, Sweden, the Netherlands, Canada and Australia (OECD, 2004), where the uptake 
of ICT is partly linked to differences in the direct costs of ICT (ICT equipment, 
telecommunications, installations of e-commerce systems etc.). These costs still differ 
across OECD countries despite rising ICT trade and the liberalization of 
telecommunications. Moreover, countries differ in the degree of competition in ICT 
markets and in their respective ability to absorb ICT and use this technology effectively, 
which in turn is related to the availability of know-how and skilled labor. There also could 
be some impediment on complementary process innovations in Europe which explains the 
relatively modest productivity gains in some continental EU countries, and a lack of new 
firm creation in ICT-using services could play a role. 
HEMPELL (2006) has emphasized that ICT is not a panacea for productivity gains; 
rather ICT raises productivity mainly by acting as a catalyst of innovation and upgrading of 
skills. He basically suggests several conclusions based on a large sample of German firms 
and findings for the Netherlands (HEMPELL et al. 2004). ICT use stimulates productivity; 
a 10% increase in the firm’s ICT capital stock raises company productivity by roughly 
0.6%. Given relative factor endowments in the sample of firms considered, annual returns 
to ICT investment are likely to exceed its user costs for many years to come. A crucial 
element of ICT productivity reflects improved quality of output. Quality improvements are 
quite important. Productive ICT use is complemented by innovation dynamics and 
innovative activities. Successful use of computers and internet requires companies to 
introduce their own innovations. Innovation history is important; service firms that have 
introduced innovations in the past are found to be better in using ICT productively than 
firms that have not, and the empirical results point to a major role of process innovation as 
a basic source of experience for ICT use. ICT productivity is contingent on the skills of 
workers and employees: the higher the share of highly-skilled workers in firms, the greater 
the productivity contribution of ICT.  
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•  For the medium term, HEMPELL (2006, p. 182) sees two partially-opposed ICT 
developments. ICT access will become simplified and ubiquitous and innovation 
opportunities more complex and expensive from ICT use. 
•  On the one hand, falling computer prices and increasingly standardized software 
will make ICT more ubiquitous and simpler so that ICT could become less 
important for the sustained competitive advantage of firms. This implies that ICT 
will diffuse in the world economy. 
•  Technological progress in ICT hardware and software imply new options for a 
growing range of ever more complex innovations, including novel types of 
knowledge management.  This includes ICT-based new tools and broadband 
internet access, which will facilitate collaboration of R&D teams scattered around 
the world (FRAUNHOFER-GESELLSCHAFT, 2004). The implication is that the 
internationalization of ICT as a high-technology field will be concentrated in 
advanced countries endowed with highly skilled labor and which have made 
investments in modern broadband e-communications networks. North America, 
Europe, Japan and a few Asian countries will fall into this category. 
With the economic opening up of China and the transformation of the former Soviet Union 
and east European countries, a large part of the world economy (richly endowed with labor 
in the case of China and with labor and human capital in the case of Eastern Europe and 
Russia) has become integrated into the global economy. Both growing trade and rising FDI 
flows – mainly inflows – play a role for Eastern Europe and China/Asean countries. China 
and East Asian countries have become a major export region for ICT goods; however, 
considering Asia a natural winner in the process of modern globalization would be an 




2.2  Financial Markets and ICT 
Banks are top users of ICT and also are heavy users of digital services. For international 
banks, communication costs represent a high share of costs and with sustained competition 
in telecommunications and continuing technological digital progress, banks will be able to 
strongly benefit from ICT dynamics. One particular aspect is eBanking, which offers a 
broad range of new digital banking services to national and international customers. 
However, apparent security problems indicate that there is no easy way to achieve long 
term growth in eBanking and other digital financial services. At the same time, one may 
point out that the US has developed internet-based venture capital funds which create 
larger funds, offer better transparency and stimulate reputation building.  
In a broader perspective, there are also other links between the financial market system 
and ICT; the most interesting are the following: 
•  Banks, insurance companies and other financial services firms are among the 
heavy ICT investors so that this sector has been characterized by high ICT-based  
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productivity growth. The financial services sectors in the UK and the US have 
been quite strong in pushing ICT.  
•  Prudential supervision in the Basel II framework eliminates most of the traditional 
continental European relationship banking and puts strong emphasis on 
computerized monitoring of clients and debtors. The expansion of digital networks 
will reinforce the ability of banks to put all major financial activities of clients 
permanently on the radar screen.  
•  Data protection in the financial and personal sphere becomes increasingly 
important with ICT expansion. Problems of government in effectively taxing 
transactions over the internet will generate pressure for tax authorities to 
increasingly peek into internet users’ e-commerce transaction. Moreover, internet-
based advertising will become more personalized, which leads to the issue of 
consumer protection and data protection in a sensitive area. While customers have 
certain benefits from getting personalized advertisement, there is also the problem 
that the consumer is relatively losing control over the advertisement presented to 
him or her. Digital bonus programs further reinforce some of the problems with 
firms generally being happy to exploit data mining in a broad form. (Customers 
who regularly spend lavishly on products might never see the cheapest offer of 
some internet services companies as the customer’s profile points to low price 
sensitivity.) 
•  The expansion of ICT will create particular problems for the bank-dominated 
financial systems to finance the growth of ICT. Since ICT often is characterized by 
a high intensity of immaterial assets – or the use of assets whose price is falling 
rapidly – banks will find it rather difficult to finance the expansion of young ICT 
firms. This will generate pressure to reform the financial system in continental EU 
countries and to reinforce the role of stock markets. As the US is the global leader 
of the stock markets, the EU markets could become dominated by these markets. 
•  ICT expansion will affect adjustment parameters in goods markets and financial 
markets and thereby influence the equilibrium solution in any standard macro 
model; for example, price adjustment speed in all markets will increase and 
collecting, processing and storing information should become easier so that the 
formation of expectations is thereby influenced. 
To the extent that ICT expansion helps to create greater transparency in markets and to 
reduce the risk of overshooting, there will be positive external effects from firms’ ICT 
investment. If there should be reduced volatility of asset prices, this would reduce the 
effective costs of capital and could thus raise the investment-output ratio and hence the 
level of the growth path.  
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2.3  Growth, Competitiveness and Outsourcing Dynamics 
Achieving sustained economic growth is a key challenge for industrialized countries which 
rely on the accumulation of capital, human capital formation, technological progress and 
positive spillovers to generate growth. Analytically, spillovers have played a prominent 
role in endogenous growth models which rely on constant returns to a sufficiently broad 
concept of capital accumulated over time (ROMER, 1986; 1987; LUCAS, 1988; REBELO, 
1991). Complementary approaches to endogenous growth are the R&D based models of 
ROMER (1990) and GROSSMAN/HELPMAN (1991a, 1991b), who emphasize 
accumulation and product upgrading. The emphasis in AGHION/HOWITT (1997a, 1997b) 
is on combining R&D and capital accumulation. MARREWIJK (1999) presents an 
interesting and important extension as he integrates the expansion of product variety rather 
than quality improvements (vertical differentiation as opposed to horizontal 
differentiation). He then looks at knowledge spillovers as well as learning, before finally 
considering different production technologies in the R&D sector and in the final goods 
sector. He thus departs from the standard assumption of identical technologies in these two 
sectors (RIVERA-BATIZ/ROMER, 1991; BARRO/SALA-I-MARTIN (1995), 
AGHION/HOWITT (1997a, 1997b). 
Rising trade (in intermediate products) will lead to different results if we consider 
neoclassical trade theory and modern trade theory (typically with a simple focus on two 
countries): 
•  Traditional neoclassical trade theory suggests that more trade should contribute to 
international price equalization and hence to factor price equalization, which in 
turn reinforces economic convergence. 
•  Modern trade theory offers models with skilled and unskilled labor (FEENSTRA, 
2004) where introducing trade with intermediate products leads to a relative 
increase in the demand of skilled labor in both countries. If wages are not fully 
flexible in both countries, a key result will be unemployment in one of the 
countries or in both. If one country has full employment and the other structural 
unemployment of unskilled workers, it is clear that factor price convergence and 




2.4  ICT, Outsourcing and R&D 
The EU adopted a strong focus on ICT in the 6
th and 7
th framework programme, thereby 
stimulating cross-border ICT research in the EU. However, it is unclear whether the 
Community adequately emphasizes the ICT sector and if the interplay between national 
R&D policies and supranational R&D policy is optimal. R&D policy is optimal if positive 
external effects are internalized efficiently. National external effects can be internalized 
mainly at the national level. International external effects could be internalized through 
R&D policy in partner countries or through adequate supranational policy. If there is  
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insufficient international cooperation (within the EU or within the OECD), the level of 
innovation policy will be sub-optimal. From the perspective of the respective government, 
it is clear that positive growth effects and the associated additional tax revenues provide an 
incentive for R&D promotion.  
R&D intensities in the EU do not seem to converge across countries; only for a 
subgroup of early leading EU countries and Finland can a convergence be observed. At the 
same time, empirical evidence exists for a convergence of trade structure among EU15 
(JUNGMITTAG, 2006). It is, however, unclear what convergence really means here. One 
may state the hypothesis that through increasing vertical trade – within industries – there is 
some structural convergence in the EU (or in the world economy). If convergence is to 
mean that intermediate products with low profit rates are more and more concentrated in 
Spain and Portugal while final goods production is in Germany, France, the UK and the 
Benelux group as well as Scandinavian countries and Ireland, one would not really expect 
economic convergence in terms of per capita income. The main reason for non-
convergence or divergence is that final goods producers in technology-intensive industries 
will appropriate a Schumpeterian rent in their respective profit rates. In a Heckscher-Ohlin 
approach to international trade, technologies are the same across countries. For this reason, 
Schumpeterian profit differentials across countries cannot play a role. In reality 
Schumpeterian profits indeed play a crucial role; this holds not only for countries with high 
patent intensities but also for countries with a specialization in sectors shaped by high 
progress rates. ICT is such a sector; the OECD (2002) has emphasized that it is one of the 
most important fields of innovation dynamics in the US and other OECD countries. 
 
2.4.1  ICT Dynamics: Outsourcing and Insourcing 
ICT facilitates national and international outsourcing (WELFENS, 2005) and also raises 
the range of tradability in the services sector; the N-sector shrinks (see the figure: dashed 
line in country II) while the T-sector grows. The firm T1  considered in country I can 
outsource tradable goods and services domestically – say to firms T11 and T12 – or to the 
domestic N-sector. As regards intermediate tradables, there is potential competition with 
suppliers abroad; the split between outsourcing to domestic suppliers and foreign suppliers 
typically will be determined along the lines of the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson approach. 
As countries I and II differ in terms of relative factor endowment, international outsourcing 
will be favored with respect to those components which use the factors intensively which 
are relatively abundant in country II. 
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Figure 1: National and International Outsourcing / Fragmentation of ICT Production 
(T is tradables sector; N is nontradables sector) 
Country I  Country II 


























A large share of ICT is strongly technology intensive and therefore international 
outsourcing is often in the form of offshoring. Offshoring allows not only for cutting costs 
by importing from foreign subsidiaries in the tradables sector, but in principle there is also 
the option that ICT offshoring take place in the foreign non-tradables sector (case of 
special ICT services). Intermediate inputs from foreign subsidiaries go into production of 
firm T1 in country I; however, part of valued-added in foreign subsidiaries could be sold 
directly on the world market (country III). As the R&D intensity of ICT is expected to 
grow over time, one should expect offshoring to increase in importance in the long run. 
In some ICT sectors network effects are relevant; to the extent that those effects are 
international, outsourcing dynamics could be influenced. From a theoretical perspective, 
international network effects are of particular importance in ICT innovations in certain 
fields. Network effects are positive demand-side externalities, which are rather unusual. 
ICT R&D is likely to have positive cross-sector spillover effects. One also may anticipate 
considerable international spillovers, either in the ICT sector itself or through increasing 
use of ICT capital in other sectors. One should, however, carefully distinguish sub-sectors 
of ICT. For example, chip production is scale intensive and knowledge intensive (referring 
to the overall product not the rather simple chip production as such) as is software. 
However, many digital services have to be very customer specific so that economies of 
scale play a limited role. To some extent economies of scale can be exploited for the basic 
product – say the core algorithm – while customization requires specific adjustment 
involving the employment of skilled labor.  
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Figure 2: ICT and International Offshoring Opportunities 
(including direction of sales from subsidiary ▬►) 
Country I  Country II 















While ICT facilitates international outsourcing, it is not true that leading OECD countries 
are natural losers from outsourcing. Indeed, international outsourcing can stimulate 
structural adjustment in a way which increases productivity, competitiveness and growth. 
Moreover, international outsourcing from the EU to Eastern Europe, Asia or elsewhere 
goes along with insourcing in the sense that firms from Asia and other regions of the world 
economy can conquer markets in EU countries/OECD countries only if they set up 
marketing centers and R&D facilities in those countries (which have a comparative 
advantage in relevant R&D fields). Two important studies can be found in this context: 
•  BAILEY/LAWRENCE (2005) have shown that the US software sector 
internationally outsourced some 100,000 jobs in the period from 2000 to 2003. 
However, the overall number of software personnel in the US increased in that 
period. Mostly, rather simple programming jobs were outsourced, often to Asian 
countries. This suggests that the international outsourcing of standardized services 
will allow advanced countries with a relative abundance of skilled workers to 
specialize increasingly in advanced services. The EU15 should also benefit in a 
similar way, as leading software firms become more globally competitive by 
outsourcing to Eastern Europe or Asia. 
•  As regards the outsourcing of services, a broader picture is obtained if one takes 
into account data on the largest absolute insourcers, the principal world relative 
insourcers (for business services and computer & information services) and the 
biggest surplus and deficit countries (AMITI/WEI, 2005a; 2005b). In 2002, the top 
insourcers in business services were the US, the UK, Germany, France, the 
Netherlands, India, Japan, China and Russia; as regards computer & information 
services No. 1 was Ireland followed – with the exception of Spain – roughly by the 
same list of countries.  
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As regards the outsourcing of services in Europe, the study by AMITI/WEI (2005a) is 
quite interesting. They follow the study of FEENSTRA/HANSON (1996, 1999) – their 
focus was on material inputs outsourcing of the US – in their definition of outsourcing. 
Defining Y, J and X as production, imports and exports, respectively, the outsourcing 
intensity Ω of sector i is defined as: 
Ωi = (Input purchase of service by i/total nonenergy inputs used by i) (Ji/[Yi+Ji-Xi]) 
In the AMITI/WEI study, the denominator includes all non-energy material inputs as 
well as the five business service industries: communication, financial services, insurance, 
other business services, computing and information. The authors only report figures for the 
UK where the figures are rough estimates, as no sectoral data on imported services inputs 
are available; instead the economy-wide import share is applied to each industry (the UK 
imported 6.6% of business services in 2001; it thus is assumed that each industry – in 
manufacturing and services – imports 6.6% of the business services used in that year; as 
the ratio of business services to total non-energy material inputs is 15%, the outsourcing 
intensity of business services is 0.15*0.066 = 1%.). The authors aggregate across the five 
service inputs and thereby obtain the average service outsourcing intensity in each 
industry. Unfortunately AMITI/WEI do not provide a split of imports according to intra-
EU service imports and extra-EU services imports. They also do not look into the topic of 
transfer pricing which, however, might be rather important in the context of outsourcing of 
services in countries with considerable inward or outward stocks of foreign direct 
investment. The figures for the UK for 1992 and 2001 show that there has been a modest 
increase in international outsourcing of services, except in the case of communications 
services. The latter finding can probably be explained through the fall of 
telecommunications prices in the 1990s triggered by increasing competition in EU 
countries and technological progress. This shows that it can be quite important to carefully 
split purchase figures into prices and quantities. 
Figure 3: UK: Outsourcing of Services  
Services  Share of Service                   Import of service j  
   Mean  Std Dev    
1992        
Communication 0.0153  0.0373  0.0587 
Financial 0.0330  0.0247  0.0173 
Insurance 0.0137  0.0103  0.0186 
Other business service  0.1261  0.1615  0.0503 
Computer and Information  0.0112  0.0185  0.0148 
         
2001        
Communication 0.0158  0.0393  0.0547 
Financial 0.0306  0.0198  0.0420 
Insurance 0.0123  0.0060  0.0230 
Other business service  0.1536  0.1872  0.0659 
Computer and Information  0.0211  0.0302  0.0283 
Source: AMITI/WEI, 2005a, p. 319  
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The average outsourcing of services – relative to GDP – has increased in the UK (from 
1.4% in 1992 to 2.6% in 2001) and the US (0.6 and 0.9%, respectively) (AMITI/WEI, 
2005a; 2005b). By contrast, material outsourcing intensities are much higher in both the 
US and the UK. At the beginning of the 21st century, it was about 27% in the UK and 11% 
in the US; the figure for the UK peaked in 1996. In the US, the outsourcing of material 
inputs is a sustained phenomenon, although in the period from 1992 to 2001 the growth 
rate was lower than in services.  
The leading 10 exporters in the field of computer and information services are Ireland 
(14 bill. in 2003; this includes revenues from software sales), India, the US, the UK, 
Germany, Israel, Spain, Canada, Netherlands and Sweden (2 bill.); the global figure is 75.1 
bill, to which the EU has accounted for an impressive 40.7 bill. (WTO, 2005). Israel and 
Spain are two interesting newcomer countries in the export of computer and information 
services. The “effective US surplus” of 2.4 bill. – defined not geographically but on a 
company basis – is certainly higher than the US figure indicates, as more than one-half of 
the Irish figure is likely to represent activities of US subsidiaries.  
The relatively biggest insourcers of business services (relative to local GDP) were 
Vanuatu, Singapore, Hong Kong, Papua New Guinea and Luxembourg, which recorded 
business services outsourcing in the range of 17% to 10% of GDP; rank 21 is for India, 33 
for the UK, 50 for France, 54 for Germany, 79 for China, 88 for Russia, 90 for the US, and 
95 for Japan. The average share of the UK (2.35%), France (1.45%) and Germany (1.40%) 
was more than twice as high as the share of the US of 0.58% of GDP; hence even under the 
assumption that leading EU countries’ insourcing represents one-half of the insourcing 
from other EU countries, the combined position of the UK/France/Germany is favorable. 
As regards computer and information services Ireland, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Costa Rica 
and Belgium were the top 5 (with a rang of 8.5% to 0.8%), rank 17 was for the UK, 24 for 
Germany, 42 for France, 49 for the US. Thus one may state that for some of the small open 
economies in the EU, there has been relatively successful insourcing which reflects a 
particular specialization in ICT services. As regards large countries, it is not surprising that 
insourcing figures are rather small relative to GDP, as most regional outsourcing in a large 
economy is regional insourcing; this is in contrast to small open economies. 
Figure 4: Biggest Absolute Insourcers in the World Economy, (Business Services and 
Computer & Information Services), 2002 
Rank Country  Business 
services 
Rank  Country  Computer and infor-
mation services 
1 United  States  58.794  1 Ireland  10.426 
2  United Kingdom  36.740  2  United Kingdom  5.675 
3 Germany  27.907  3 United  States  5.431 
4 France  20.864  4 Germany  5.185 
5 Netherlands  20.074  5 Spain  2.487 
6 India  18.630  10  France  1.191 
8 Japan  17.401  11  Japan  1.140 
14  China, P.R.  10.419  12  China, P.R.  638 
29 Russia  2.012  25 Russia  137 
Source: Amiti / Wei (2005), p. 324  
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Figure 5: Biggest Relative Insourcers in the World Economy (Business Services and 
Computer & Information Services), 2002 
Rank Economy  Business 
services 




A. Ratio to Local GDP (%) 
1 Vanuatu  17,13  1  Ireland  8,54 
2 Singapore  14,98  2  Cyprus  2,19 
3 Hong  Kong  SAR  11,53  3  Luxembourg  1,09 
4  Papua New Guinea  10,55  4  Costa Rica  0,91 
5 Luxembourg  9,78  5  Belgium  0,76 
21 India  3,79  17  United  Kingdom 0,36 
33 United  Kingdom  2,35  24  Germany  0,26 
50 France  1,45  42  France  0,08 
54 Germany  1,40  49  United  States  0,05 
79  China, P.R.  0,82  51  China, P.R.  0,05 
88 Russia  0,58  54  Russia  0,04 
90 United  States  0,56  59  Japan  0,03 
95 Japan  0,44       
B. Ratio to Value-added of Local Service Sector (%) 
1  Papua New Guinea  32,92  1  Ireland  15,64 
2  Vanuatu 23,85  2  Guyana 1,50 
3 Singapore  21,93  3  Costa  Rica  1,46 
4 Swaziland  16,06  4  Luxembourg  1,40 
5 Hong  Kong  SAR  13,46  5  Armenia  1,09 
13 India  7,82  18  United  Kingdom 0,51 
44 United  Kingdom  3,28  24  Germany  0,38 
53  China, P.R.  2,45  38  China, P.R.  0,15 
64 Germany  2,07  42  France  0,12 
66 France  2,03  51  Russia  0,07 
87 Russia  1,04  52  United  States  0,07 
91 United  States  0,76  60  Japan  0,04 
94 Japan  0,66       
Source: Amiti / Wei (2005), p. 325  
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Figure 6: Biggest Services Trade Surplus Countries (Business Services and Computer 
& Information Services), 2002 
Rank Economy  Business 
services 




Surplus countries  Surplus countries 
1 United  Kingdom 20.555,96  1 Ireland  9.882,71 
2 United  States  17.864,30  2 United  States  3.884,00 
3 Hong  Kong  SAR 15.424,54  3 United  Kingdom 3.072,72 
4 India  6.813,44  4 Canada  1.077,12 
5 Singapore  3.826,12  5 Spain  914,65 
6 China,  P.R.  2.462,05  9 France  41,39 
10 France  1.752,32  10    
Deficit countries  Deficit countries 
135 Russia  -2.570,90  95  Russia  -454,30 
139 Korea  -4.450,90  96  China,  P.R.  -494,85 
140 Japan  -7.313,51  97  Italy  -674,85 
141 Indonesia  -7.985,71  98  Germany  -939,29 
142 Germany  -11.205,43  99  Japan  -1.007,74 
143 Ireland  -13.882,01  100 Brazil  -1.118,10 
Source: Amiti / Wei (2005), p. 327 
 
At the beginning of the 21
st century, the largest global surplus countries in the field of 
business services were the UK ($ 20.6 bill.), the US, Hong Kong, India and Singapore 
(followed by China); in computer & information services, the leaders were Ireland, the US, 
the UK, Canada and Spain. The five largest deficit countries in the field of business 
information were Korea, Japan, Indonesia, Germany, Ireland; in the field of computer and 
information services, China, Italy, Germany, Japan and Brazil.  
So the picture at the beginning of the 21
st century is inconclusive, and one may draw 
only preliminary conclusions: 
•  Some EU countries are major insourcers of ICT services 
•  Some EU countries have a considerable sectoral deficit position in ICT services 
•  Some Asian countries seem to play a considerable role as successful net exporters 
of ICT services; from this perspective it will be interesting to observe whether 
subsidiaries of EU ICT multinationals are among the driving forces of those 
surpluses. If there were such a sustained phenomenon, one may assume that 
international ICT outsourcing of EU firms reflects a win-win international division 
of labor in the digital world economy.  
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2.4.2  ICT and R&D 
ICT – broadly defined – is a strong driver of innovation dynamics in OECD countries. 
According to the European Innovation Scoreboard 2006, electrical and optical equipment 
and ICT information and communication technologies as well as computer and related 
activities show the highest ranking of average innovation performance by sector. This 
indicates a strong relevance of ICT for growth and structural change. R&D activities in 
ICT are strongly internationalized in some sub-sectors, including software development. 
(The US, the EU, China and India plus Japan are strong centers of software development; 
some of the US firms’ and EU firms’ activities in China and India partly reflect the search 
for comparative advantage and cost-cutting. There is, however, also pressure by 
governments of these big countries, namely to give access to markets only under the 
condition that firms establish a development center.) 
Figure 7: Sectoral Innovation Performance in the EU 



























0,00 0,10 0,20 0,30 0,40 0,50 0,60 0,70
I Transport, storage and communication
C Mining and quarrying
DB Textiles and textile products
G51  Wholesale trade and sommission trade
E Electricity, gas and water supply
DD20 Wood and products of wood, exc. furniture
J Financial intermediation
DA Food products; beverages and tobacco
Business services
DJ28 Fabricated metal products, exc. machinery and eq.
DE Paper and paper products; publishing and printing
DI26 Other non metallic mineral products
Total
DJ27 Basic metals
Total industry (excluding construction)
D M anufacturing
DH25 Rubber and plastic products
DK29 Machinery and equipment n.e.c.
DM Transport equipment
DL31  Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c.
K Real estate, renting and business activities
DM34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
DG24 Chemicals and chemical products
K72 Computer and related activities
ICT Information and communication technologies
DL Electrical and optical equipment
 
Source: European Innovation Scoreboard (2005), S. 23 
  
As regards links between the US, the EU and Japan, one should emphasize the role of 
international R&D alliances, which became rather important in the 1980s and 1990s in 
OECD countries – not only in ICT. As regards international alliances, the emphasis is more 
on EU15 countries than on EU accession countries. Strategic R&D alliances played an 
increasing role in the EU in the late 1980s, as globalization and the run-up to the single 
market programme as well as higher EU funds for cooperative R&D projects stimulated 
the internationalization of European R&D (NARULA, 2000); the IT sector and 
biotechnology played a particular role in this respect. Moreover, there have also been 
renewed dynamics in R&D in the form of both asset-exploiting and asset-seeking FDI in 
the EU and the US. CRISCUOLO/NARULA/VERSPAGEN (2005) argue that R&D 
facility’s capacity to exploit technological competences is a function not just of its own 
resources, but also of the efficiency with which it can utilise complementary resources  
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associated with the relevant local innovation system. The empirical analysis indicates that 
both EU (US) affiliates in the US (EU) rely strongly on home region knowledge sources, 
although they appear to exploit the host knowledge base as well. The crucial emphasis on 
home knowledge suggests doubts about a potential R&D strategy of the EU which would 
neglect the EU countries as prime locations for leading edge R&D in technologically 
dynamics sectors, in particular the ICT sector. One must also raise the issue as to which 
extent the expansion of ICT requires reforms of the innovation system and in particular a 
stronger role of virtual research networks and “Digital Universities.” Optimal linkages 
between R&D facilities and firms in technology-intensive sectors are crucial, which will 
naturally include foreign investors. 
Both the US and the EU belong to the group of major source countries and host 
countries while Japan is mainly a source country of FDI – at least if one is to believe 
Japanese statistics (note: according to US FDI outflow statistics, Japan should have high 
US FDI inflows). In the US and the EU, innovation plays a crucial role for economic 
growth. The US and several EU countries achieved rather high growth rates of per capita 
income and total factor productivity in the 1990s, and the expansion of information and 
communication technologies (ICT) played a particular role. From a theoretical perspective, 
one may emphasize the endogenous growth model of ZON/MUYSKEN (2005), who 
highlighted in a refined LUCAS-model the role of ICT in a modern growth model, where 
the ICT capital intensity has a positive impact on the knowledge accumulation process. 
ICT is important both in final goods production and in knowledge accumulation. The 
expansion of knowledge and the rise in ICT capital intensity contribute to higher steady 
state growth of output. Knowledge accumulation thus plays an important role in economic 
growth. The implication is that the long run increase in ICT capital intensity in OECD 
countries and NICs – fuelled by falling relative prices of ICT capital goods – will reinforce 
the role of knowledge in production. As regards long term dynamics one should, however, 
not overlook the problems of information markets themselves, which suffer from market 
imperfections. The special aspects of ICT and growth will not be analyzed here as many 
special aspects would have to be emphasized, including the considerable role of intangible 
assets, network effects as a dynamic demand side-effect and static as well as dynamic 
economies of scale in several sub-sectors. ICT seems to facilitate the outsourcing of 
services as it supports virtual mobility of the supply-side and the demand side. With the 
role of digital services increasing in modern economies, one might find that the 
macroeconomic production function is characterized by economies of scale at the 
aggregate level; however, there is no clear evidence on this. 
The EU adopted the Lisbon Agenda in 2000, emphasizing the need for higher 
innovation, higher growth and higher employment. According to this agenda, the EU 
should become the most dynamic knowledge-based economy by 2010. Interim results are 
rather sobering according to the KOK (2004) report; with EU eastern enlargement the EU 
faces additional challenges. The EU is moving increasingly towards a digitally networked 
high technology knowledge society. Western Europe’s high-wage countries particularly 
face the need to adjust to globalization and EU eastern enlargement in a way which 
requires an increased use of information and communication technology. ICT is one of the 
most dynamic fields in terms of technological progress in OECD countries and is therefore 
of prime importance for economic growth, productivity increases and employment. ICT  
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markets in Europe and worldwide are growing at a pace which exceeds both regional and 
global economic growth.  
The ICT sector has also become a major driver of the innovation process and of 
productivity growth. High Schumpeterian dynamics are not only observed in ICT 
production but also in the use of ICT. Hence ICT investment relative to overall investment 
may be expected to grow continuously, not least because falling relative prices of software 
and hardware stimulate ICT investment. With digital (broadband and narrowband) 
networks expanding in Europe, North America, Asia and in other regions of the world, one 
may anticipate a further acceleration in digital knowledge creation and information as well 
as e-commerce – often associated with favourable network effects as well. With so many 
changes shaped by ICT, the question arises as to whether traditional economic systems, 
historically shaped by industry, should adjust in order to optimally support – digital – 
economic growth. The liberalization of EU telecommunications in 1998 (UK already in 
1984) stimulated product innovations and possibly innovations in the overall 
telecommunications sector. The picture for telecommunication network operators is 
inconclusive as one finds some firms with rising R&D-sales ratios and other with falling 
R&D-sales ratios. One cannot, however, overlook that the R&D-sales ratio of the 
equipment industry has increased, which suggests that in the course of restructuring of 
telecommunications network operators – in the post-1998 period – R&D activities were 
effectively shifted to a considerable extent to the equipment industry, which is both 
knowledge-intensive and scale-intensive. The more competition drives e-communication 
towards global technological standards, the higher the pressure in the equipment industry 
to consolidate. It is noteworthy that R&D-sales ratios of telecommunications operators are 
lower than in the continental EU, where the liberalization of the telecommunications sector 
occurred only 14 years after the opening of the market in the US. 
Taking a broader look at R&D expenditure in ICT – relative to overall business R&D 
expenditure – one can observe considerable differences across countries. Ireland and the 
Scandinavian EU countries were leaders at the beginning of the 21
st century. The three top 
OECD countries – Ireland, Finland and Korea – spent 70, 64 and 50% of total business 
R&D expenditures on ICT in 2003. Canada, the Netherlands, the US and Japan followed 
with an ICT share of about 35%; France had 31%, the UK 24 and Germany, Italy and 
Spain about 22%. Ireland, the UK, Norway, Denmark, Australia, Spain and the Czech 
Republic had a relatively high share of R&D ICT expenditures in the service sector. The 
ranking in terms of ICT patents looks rather similar to that in ICT R&D expenditures. The 
top countries are Singapore, Finland, Israel, Korea, Netherlands and Japan, Ireland the US, 
Canada and Sweden, which recorded an ICT patent share of close to or above 40% (top 
scorers Singapore and Finland close to 60%) based on figures at the European Patent 
Office. These countries were followed by the UK, Chinese Taipei, China, Australia, 
Hungary France, EU, Russia, Germany, Norway, Switzerland, Denmark, New Zealand, 
South Africa, Belgium Spain, Austria, Italy, India and Brazil. It is clear that the ICT patent 
position of US firms – with subsidiaries in many of the top countries – is much stronger 
than that of the US as a country. Moreover, taking a look at US figures shows a clear US 
lead even if one assumes that there is a home bias (in the US in favour of US firms, in the 
EU in favour of EU firms). As regards ICT goods, Japan is very strong in global markets.  
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This also becomes apparent from the fact that Japan’s share in EPO patents was very close 
to the share of the US (see subsequent figures/tables). 
As regards ICT employment – narrowly defined – an increase can be seen in most 
OECD countries in the period from 1995 to 2003. Ireland is a negative example. The share 
of ICT-related occupations in the total economy was in a range of 3-5%. Sweden was the 
OECD leader in 2003, and the US was ahead of the EU by almost 1 percentage point. This 
finding points to a transatlantic lead on the part of the US, which is well ahead of the EU in 
terms of patenting, R&D-sales ratio and employment. Given the relatively small 
employment shares, it is impressive to see how important ICT patents are in comparison 
with other sectors. As regards EU innovation dynamics, one might want to consider a 
broader coordinated R&D effort in the ICT sector, in particular some form of coordinated 
international R&D program. The latter should not mean that all EU countries or very many 
are embarking upon coordinated projects under the heading of EU programmes. Rather it 
would be desirable for several countries to team up under the heading of a multi-country 
ICT R&D programme of excellence. The typical EU R&D programme, which effectively 
requires involving countries/partners from Western Europe, Eastern Europe and the 
Cohesion countries, makes ICT projects unnecessarily complex and often undermines 
efficiency. The EU might well want to subsidize employment of R&D researchers from 
relatively poor countries in leading EU R&D countries. There could be a particular role for 
EU-funded R&D projects, but overemphasizing EU projects is damaging for European 
innovation dynamics. Political control of EU R&D policy is rather weak and implies 
inefficiency risks. The EU might want to consider a special role for the supranational 
policy level in stimulating diffusion and in financing R&D centres of excellence in the 
Community. Finally, there is a major inconsistency in the EU R&D projects, which 
typically require 50% co-financing.  
As regards university research institutes, one should expect that national government or 
special R&D funds with partial government funding would provide the co-financing for 
successful bidders. This is not the case and indeed is adequate for industrial R&D 
consortia. However, only a rather limited number of R&D projects are dominated by the 
business community, namely in applied R&D. Fundamental R&D should be financed 
mainly by government. In Germany and several other EU countries – including eastern 
European accession countries – there is no adequate co-financing from governments for 
projects in fundamental research. Moreover, the broad lack of private universities in most 
EU countries means that there is insufficient funding of higher education and insufficient 
R&D activities at the same time (e.g., Germany spends only 1% of its national income on 
university funding and has very few private universities, which are all very small).  
The ICT sector has a special feature which makes adequate financing of innovation 
projects difficult in the continental EU countries. Many sub-sectors of ICT are 
characterized by a high share of intangible assets which undermines bank financing. The 
typical bank will always want collateral, and neither intangible assets (e.g., software) nor 
computer equipment – whose price absolutely falls over time – can serve as collateral for 
bank financing. This implies for many Eurozone countries that one has enormous problems 
in financing innovative young ICT firms. Interestingly, there are some big companies such 
as Siemens, SAP and Deutsche Telekom which have set up special venture capital funds. 
However, the general conclusion is that the Euro zone countries should move more  
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towards a capital market system and thus become more Anglo-Saxon in terms of the 
financial market system. Financial markets are important for growth and structural change 
(WELFENS/WOLF, 1997). Mutatis mutandis this also holds for university financing, 
where continental EU countries have underdeveloped banking markets for students. Part of 
EU underfunding of the university system is actually due to a lack of private universities 
on the one hand and of adequate financing for university study on the other. As one may 
argue from a theoretical perspective, adequate financial market deepening will contribute 
to a higher level of growth and potentially to a higher trend growth rate (namely to the 
extent that the structure of financial markets influences R&D intensity and human capital 
formation and hence contributes to endogenous growth dynamics). One should make 
serious efforts in the new EU knowledge society to develop financial institutions that are 
up to the challenges and opportunities of the digital age. These arguments, however, do not 
imply that one should underestimate the risks from volatile stock markets. 
Slow growth in the Eurozone over many years – in particular in Germany and Italy – 
should be a wake-up call for many continental EU countries to modernize the innovation 
system and to put more emphasis on R&D funding; this must at the same time become 
more efficient. Conditional tax credits should play a larger role than traditional subsidies, 
which effectively favour large firms that can afford to spend considerable sums of money 
on active lobbying. R&D tax credits would be less distorting in the sense that large 
countries and SMEs would act on a more level playing field. Since innovative SMEs are so 
important in R&D in the ICT sector – and since Germany/the Eurozone is lagging behind 
the US – one should seriously consider the reform proposals made here (and others made 
subsequently).  
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Figure 8: R&D expenditure in selected ICT industries, 2003 or latest year available 









































R&D expenditure in ICT manufacturing industries (1) 
R&D expenditure in ICT services industries (2) 
 
Source: OECD, ANBERD database, March 2005.  
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Figure 9: ICT patents1 as a percentage of national total (EPO) in selected countries2. 
























































































































































































































































































1. The provisional definition of ICT patents is presented in Annex B of the OECD compendium  
2. Cut-off point: countries with more than 100 EPO applications in 2000 
Source: OECD, Patent Database, September 2004 
Figure 10:  ICT employment across the economy- Share of ICT-related occupations  


































































































































































































Based on methodology developed in chapter 6 of the Information Technology Outlook 2004. See 
also van Welsum, D., and G. Vickery (2004), New perspectives on ICT skills and employment, 
Information Economy Working Paper DSTI/ICCP/IE(2004)10, OECD. 
2. 2002 instead of 2003 
3. 1997 instead of 1995. 
4. Estimates. 
Source: OECD Information Technology Outlook 2004  
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Figure 11:  Share of countries in ICT patents’ at the EPO, according to the residence 
of the inventors, by priority year 
 
The provisional definition of ICT patents is presented in Annex B of the Compendium of patent 
statistics 2004. 
Note : See table for footnote 




2.5  Regional Integration Dynamics 
The international division of labor is changing at a global scale, and changes in 
competitiveness in ICT sector are of particular interest. This is also an important issue in 
the context of EU eastern enlargement, namely whether new member countries can 
reinforce the Community’s competitiveness in global ICT markets. This topic can be 
analyzed by examining the development of RCAs (sectoral export-import balance relative 
to country’s total global export-import balance) in relevant fields, here telecommunications 
industry and office machinery & computers. An RCA exceeding unity is considered a 
favorable sign of competitiveness. Those countries with an RCA exceeding unity over a 
considerable time period are strong competitors in world markets. With respect to RCAs, 
there is, however, one caveat, namely that the RCA is a sectoral trade ratio relative to an 
overall export-import ratio where overall exports and imports might reflect rather low 
technology products; this aspect in turn should be visible in the weighted absolute export 
unit value for all exports (and import unit value for all imports), which naturally will be 
much lower than in a high income country in which trade is more concentrated on 
medium-technology and high-technology products which carry relatively high absolute 
prices (both export unit values and import unit values). Thus, one may suggest defining a 
relative price weighted RCA where the respective sectoral RCA is weighted with the  
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relative sectoral export unit value (country I relative to country II in a model or relative to 
the rest of the world in reality). One could first identify the RCAs exceeding unity and then 
multiply those with the relative export unit value in order to get an economic weighting of 
the RCA; in practice relative export unit value could simply mean comparing the sectoral 
export unit value of country i to that of the respective value of the US. In the perspective 
suggested here, an RCA in a high income country (with relatively high export unit values) 
slightly exceeding unity is more impressive than an RCA strongly exceeding unity in an 
economy with a small relative export unity value. In this perspective, economic catching 
up requires economic upgrading leading to a long term increase in the weighted export unit 
value and a increased role of RCAs exceeding unity in those sectors where high 
Schumpeterian economic rents are earned, namely in scale intensive, technology-intensive 
and knowledge-intensive goods.   
In the following paragraphs, we use “modified” RCA which is the ratio of a countries 
export share in a sector (for certain relevant markets) to the export share of the 
competitor’s countries in the same market.  Here the relevant market is the EU15.  An 
indicator above unity shows a comparative advantage in the respective sector. As regards 
the telecommunications industry, one may note that the RCA of Japan declined 
considerably in the decade from 1993 to 2004, yet in 2004 Japan still had a positive RCA. 
The US has a “negative” RCA (RCA below unity), with its position having deteriorated at 
the beginning of the 21
st century.  
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Thus it is noteworthy that the Czech Republic, Hungary and Estonia have developed an 
RCA exceeding unity in the early 21
st century. This reinforces the particular strength of 
leading EU15 countries, namely of the UK, Finland and Sweden, to some extent also of 
France. As regards office machinery and computers, one may emphasize that this sector  
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has become more price competitive in the early 21
st century. Japan’s favorable RCA 
position has strongly eroded in the period 1993-2004, and the country was below an RCA 
of unity in 2004. The US had a rather stable RCA index which was slightly below unity. 
Hungary and the Czech Republic have joined Ireland and the UK in their favorable RCA 
position among EU countries. 
The more interesting field here certainly is software whose role is rising relative to that 
of computers. Software development involves, by and large, much human capital. This 
statement does not, however, suggest that one could not find useful steps in software 
development which can be outsourced internationally. Standardized relatively simple tasks 
in programming can be outsourced conveniently in the internet age. However, the final 
testing and the high end programming are typically made in advanced OECD countries. 
 




































3.  Economic Stability: ICT and FDI in a Modified Dornbusch 
Model 
Information & Communication Technology and the Dornbusch Model 
A standard model for medium-term exchange rate analysis is the Dornbusch model, which 
emphasizes the interplay of rapidly reacting financial markets (the nominal interest rate 
and the exchange rate adjust instantaneously) and the macroeconomic goods market in 
which the adjustment speed (i.e., the change of the price level) is rather slow. A key feature 
of the model is an overshooting of the exchange rate, namely that the short-term reaction of 
the exchange rate is stronger than the medium term equilibrium adjustment would require. 
In the Dornbusch model (1976), the interest elasticity of the demand for money and the 
type of exchange rate expectations are crucial for the overshooting problem. Regional 
monetary integration – as exemplified in the Euro zone – and technological dynamics, 
particularly the expansion of information and communication technology, signify 
interesting developments whose implications for economic stability can be highlighted 
through in the context of the Dornbusch model. How will the expansion of information and 
communication technology affect exchange rate dynamics and the 
overshooting/undershooting effects? The speed of price adjustment in the goods market is 
likely to increase, as the global supply side elasticity in an internationally networked 
society will be relatively large, in particular in the field of digital services whose share in 
aggregate demand is likely to increase over time. However, the relative adjustment speed 
of “digital financial markets” is likely to increase even faster than in the goods markets. To 
understand the basic problems we consider a modified Dornbusch model, namely a setup 
which includes foreign direct investment and thus implies a modified interest parity 
condition (WELFENS, 2006). 
Subsequently we consider a simple system of six equations: Equation (1) is a kind of 
Phillips curve, where Y# is full employment long run equilibrium output: an excess in 
demand will lead to an increase in price level. Equation (2) is a logarithmically-stated 
specification of aggregate demand. Though partly following GÄRNTER (1997), we insert 
several extensions including the impact of product innovations which are assumed to raise 
net exports; in the original formulation of GÄRTNER there is also a term related to real 
income, lnY (and a term related to trade and the exchange rate). However, the sign of the 
parameter of lnY is negative – as we will show – and not positive; this is in spite of 
hundreds of articles using ad hoc logarithmically stated demand curves where the elasticity 
of lnY is positive while it actually is negative as the relevant parameter reflects the impact 
of a change in lnY on real net exports and imports. Moreover, lnG is often in the aggregate 
demand as well, but we will replace lnG by the ratio G/Y, which is more consistent as will 
be argued subsequently.  
It is assumed that the foreign price level P* is constant and equal to unity so that 
ln(eP*/P) = lne – lnP; we define q*=eP*/P. To the extent that we consider a model with 
foreign direct investment, the parameter ψ’ does not only reflect the link between trade 
balance (ψ) and the real exchange rate but also the impact (ψ”) of the real exchange rate on 
foreign direct investment and hence on the overall investment-GDP ratio. A real 
depreciation will bring about higher net foreign direct investment inflows – relative to  
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GDP – and hence higher overall investment according to the theoretical arguments and 
empirical findings of FROOT/STEIN (1991). The perspective suggested here implies that 
ψ’=ψ+ψ”. The variable e is the current nominal exchange rate, and e# denotes the long run 
exchange rate.  
Capital market equilibrium is given by two interacting factors (i is the nominal 
exchange rate), namely the impact of portfolio investors guided by the interest rate parity 
(i=i* + E(dlne/dt)) and foreign investors who focus on long run differences in the marginal 
product of capital. As we assume that both the home and the foreign country (* denotes 
foreign variables) produce according to a Cobb Douglas function Y=K
ß(AL)
1-ß  and 
Y*=K*
ß*(A*L*)
1-ß*, respectively, the relevant variable for foreign investors is the 
difference in marginal products of capita (YK#,, YK*#), namely ßY#/K minus ß*Y#*/K#* 
where # denotes long run values. From a portfolio-theoretical perspective, real capital and 
bonds are complementary in terms of risk, as risks faced by holders of K are negatively 
correlated with that of holding bonds. Hence we state the rather simple equilibrium 
condition i+ζ(ßY#/K# -YK*#)= i*+E(dlne/dt). Thus a positive international differential of 
marginal products in favor of the home country requires that domestic interest rates fall for 
a given sum i* +E(dlne/dt). To put it differently, given the domestic and the foreign 
interest rate the required expected exchange rate depreciation rate E(dlne/dt) must rise 
along with a positive differential of marginal products since bond investment abroad would 
otherwise be insufficiently attractive now that holding domestic bonds has become more 
attractive.  
The expected devaluation rate is assumed to be proportionate to the difference between 
the equilibrium exchange rate e# and the actual exchange rate e; expressed in logarithms, 

















d = lnM 
 
International Capital Market 
 
(5) i+ζ(ßY#/K# -YK*#)= i* + E(dlne/dt)]  
 
(6) E(dlne/dt) = θ(lne#-lne)  
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Note that in the very long run (defined by equality of marginal products of capital across 
countries), equation (5) results in the standard interest rate parity condition. Here we focus 
on the short term and the long run, whereby the latter is defined by a response in the price 
level P.  
The long run change of the equilibrium exchange rate lne# with respect to a change of 
the money supply dlnM is unity. The short run reaction of the exchange rate can be 
obtained from the following equation (WELFENS, 2006) 
 
(I) lne=lne#+[lnM–lnP-φlnY#]/(θσ’)+i*/θ -[ζ/θ][(ßY#/K#–Y*K*#) 
 
Therefore, we have in the short run the following result which confirms exchange rate 
overshooting: 
 
(II)  dlne/dlnM = dlne#/dlnM +1/(θσ’) = 1 +1/(θ σ’)>1. 
 
Thus we see that the adjustment parameters relevant for overshooting are θ – the learning 
speed in the formation of exchange rate expectations – and the semi-interest elasticity of 
the demand for money (σ’); the smaller both parameters are, the higher the overshooting 
effect. Both parameters also play a role with respect to the adjustment speed for nominal 
exchange rate and price level. The adjustment speed is given by the expression π’(ψ’/σ’θ + 
ψ’)=:α”. ICT will affect some or all of the parameters. 
Since ICT facilitates access to various kinds of financial market instruments – as does 
the creation of the Euro zone (from an EU perspective) –, the interest elasticity of the 
demand for money may be expected to increase. Monetary overshooting problems should 
thus be reduced unless the learning speed in the field of exchange rate expectations should 
decrease. Moreover, ICT might indeed facilitate the learning process in markets and hence 
ICT expansion will go along with a higher adjustment parameter θ (concerns formation of 
exchange rate expectations). This implies that ICT will lead to reduced overshooting 
problems; at the same time, the adjustment speed to the new long run exchange rate 
equilibrium will slow down. From this perspective, the opportunities of an activist 
monetary policy have improved, namely in the sense that exchange rate overshooting 
problems are less severe than in the traditionally industrialized OECD countries. This 
holds all the more since one has to take into account that ICT expansion is equivalent to a 
positive supply shock which itself implies a dampening exchange rate movement. 
As regards a positive supply-shock we get as a short-term impact: 
 
(III)   dlne/dlnY# = dlne#/dlnY# - [φ/(θσ’)] - [ζß/θK#]Y# = 
-φ[1+(1/θσ’)] + [(1+Ω)/ψ’] - [ζß/θK#] Y# 
 
A positive supply-side shock is all the more likely to cause a real appreciation in the short 
term, the larger the income elasticity of the demand for money is and the higher the output  
  32 
elasticity of capital is (and the lower the capital stock is). A positive supply shock is 
reinforced by the impact of foreign direct investment which reinforces the tendency 
towards a short term appreciation. 
Moreover, note that the long run exchange rate reaction of a supply-side shock is given by: 
 
(IV) dlne#/dlnY# = -φ + [(1+Ω)/ψ’] 
  
The short-term reaction of the nominal exchange rate is more towards a nominal 
appreciation than the long term reaction. The long term real exchange rate (q*=:eP*/P) will 
depreciate as a consequence of a supply-side shock – whose nature is similar to a process 
innovation.  
 
(V) dlnq*#/dlnY# =  [(1+Ω)/ψ’]>0  
 
However, the impact of product innovations (v) imply a real appreciation (q*=:eP*/P): 
 
(VI) dlnq*#/dlnv = - η”/ψ’<0 
 
Hence the impact of ICT on the long run real exchange rate is ambiguous: If product 
innovations dominate sufficiently there will be a real appreciation; if process innovations 
are dominant there will be a depreciation of the exchange rate. 
Exchange rate overshooting depends on several parameters, including the learning 
dynamics of exchange rate expectations and the interest elasticity of the demand for 
money; the adjustment speed to the new equilibrium is influenced by the responsiveness of 
the trade balance and foreign direct investment. ICT and FDI will affect the nominal and 
real exchange rate dynamics. There are several arguments why FDI could reduce the 
problem of overshooting. From this perspective, economic globalization – in the sense of a 
rising share of FDI in overall investment – is likely to contribute to less exchange rate 
instability. If ICT for technological reasons leads to an increase in the learning speed in the 
foreign exchange market, the size of overshooting is reduced. At the same time, one might 
expect that ICT raises the price adjustment speed in the goods markets, which reinforces 
the speed of adjustment towards the new equilibrium. Monetary policy would then 
generate less overshooting than in the time of the Old Economy so that a more activist 
monetary policy could be considered. 
From an empirical perspective it would be important to find out more about the effect 
of the exchange rate regime on innovation dynamics. A fixed exchange rate regime 
basically transmits the domestic price level to those countries which have pegged the 
currency to the anchor country. If a fixed exchange rate regime helps to diffuse price 
stability worldwide – under the assumption that the anchor country pursues a stability-
oriented monetary policy leading to a low inflation rate – firms in all countries might find 
it relatively easy to conduct R&D policies which require a long term perspective; bond  
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maturities (as a proxy for the representative time horizon) are known to be relatively long 
in periods of low inflation rates. The counter-argument in favour of a flexible exchange 
rate regime is that it establishes full individual responsibility in monetary policy in each 
country so that the weighted world inflation rate could be lower under flexible exchange 
rates than in a system with a fixed exchange rate. However, there are other aspects which 
are rather unclear: will multinational companies be more active innovators in a system of 
fixed exchange rates than in a system of flexible exchange rates? More research is needed 
here. 
As regards regional integration several parameters of the (modified) Dornbusch model 
will be affected. The price adjustment parameter in the goods markets should increase, as 
this would be natural to expect in a single market – and to the extent that monetary union 
reinforces this adjustment speed, the argument is even more valid. From a Eurozone 
perspective there is the crucial issue of whether dollar exchange rate volatility in the sense 
of overshooting risks will be reduced. Indeed, less overshooting problems should be 
expected if regional integration – in particular monetary integration – raises the interest 
elasticity of the demand for money. (In a monetary union one should expect more liquid 
alternatives to holding money than in fragmented national markets.) Moreover, the 
learning speed (parameter θ) in the foreign exchange market should also increase. The 
main problem which arises in a monetary union involving countries with high sustained 
budget deficits is that there is a considerable risk that tax rates will go up. If such tax 
increases are not mainly invested in the form of higher public investment – relative to GDP 
– and higher R&D expenditure-GDP ratios, the impact on GNP could be negative in the 
long run, not least because an increasing share of GDP will accrue to foreign investors 
(from country II) who will benefit from a real depreciation through cheaper access to the 
stock of capital abroad. 
Finally, one should notice that the expansion of ICT is likely to reinforce the role of 
foreign direct investment as firm-internal transaction and management costs are reduced. 
Thus the findings with respect to FDI are reinforced through the expansion information 
and communication technology. The logarithmic formulation of the aggregate demand side 
suggested here should encourage new options to consistently develop macro models. 
Supply side shocks and product innovations will affect the exchange rate in the long run. In 
a world economy with increased innovation dynamics, the respective topics need to be 
further explored and also require additional empirical analysis. While the context of the 
modified Dornbusch model suggests a reduced risk of overshooting in a digitally 
networked economy with FDI, this does not rule out that other mechanisms relevant for 
exchange rate instability could become more relevant through the expansion of ICT. 
Indeed, if there are two groups of speculators in the foreign exchange market or the stock 
market – namely group 1, for which expectations are guided by fundamental variables 
while expectations of group 2, the chartists, follow current market trends –, a temporary 
dominance on the part of the chartists could bring about instability. With many financial 
market actors from newly industrialized countries active in a globally networked financial 
market, one cannot rule out that the influence of chartists could become quite important 
during periods of market turbulence.   
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4.  Challenges: Regulatory Policy and Life-long Learning 
There are three basic challenges for policymakers in a digitally networked European 
economy: 
•  actively shaping the global rules for digital trade (this points to the role of the 
WTO); 
•  defining adequate rules for competition in telecommunications; national regulatory 
approaches in combination with the EU framework regulation should bring about 
sustained competition and a high intensity of innovation in the EU single market; 
•  maintaining leadership in key fields of ICT, which requires not only adequate 
R&D government programmes and new initiatives to modernize the university 
system in a way which combines solid education with innovativeness; it will also 
be necessary to fully exploit the digital learning opportunities in an ageing EU 
society. 
While the WTO process is a long term challenge whose dynamics are difficult to 
anticipate, the adjustment of eCommunications rules is a more medium-term challenge for 
which the European Commission has started a Review Process on the 2002 framework 
regulation based on market analysis of 18 pre-defined markets and a broad set of rules 
ranging from universal services to access regulation. 
As regards the period 2010-2020, one may anticipate that three major drivers will 
shape eCommunications: 
•  digital convergence which already is visible in triple play services (fixed line 
telecommunications, TV and internet) or quadruple play (triple play plus mobile 
services); 
•  mobile telecommunications will increasingly become a substitute for fixed line 
telecommunications; the majority of calls in EU25 will be from mobile 
telecommunications. Moreover, there are new options for mobile internet-based 
phone calls. VoIP – internet-based telephony – will become rather common by 
2010 in the business community which is likely to use hybrid network 
configurations. At the bottom line, international communication costs will continue 
to fall which should stimulate trade and foreign investment; 
•  broadband density will increasingly matter for digital modernization of the 
economy. Here Germany and Italy are two laggards among EU countries, and most 
Eastern European member countries are rather weak. 
As the following graphs illustrate, the cross-country differentials in broadband density are 
rather large in the EU. If such differentials should be sustained, it will be rather difficult to 
fully develop a modern digital single EU market – and the innovative applications and 
productivity improvements that should go along with advanced digital networks and their 
respective services.  
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From an EU single market perspective, it will be quite important for consolidation in the 
EU telecommunications market to be facilitated. Compared to the US – with three major 
fixed network operators and four mobile operators in 2006 – the EU has an amazing  
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number of operators which act in nationally, rather fragmented markets. Anticipating true 
globalization of communications markets through VoIP services, the EU seems not to be 
well positioned in comparison to the US. Moreover, it is strange that the European 
Commission has emphasized in the Lisbon Agenda 2010 the aim of making the EU the 
most dynamic competitive knowledge-based society by 2010 while the Commissioner 
responsible for eCommunications is undermining the incentives for telecommunications 
network operators to invest in innovative networks (e.g., VDSL which is an advanced 
broadband network). The EU-imposed requirement to give competitors access to the 
VDSL network on cost-based prices is absolutely inconsistent not only with incentives for 
innovations in advanced networks and digital product innovations; it also is contradictory 
to the European Commission’s own principle that new markets should not be regulated. 
Achieving the goals of the Lisbon Agenda without strong national and supranational 
support for ICT innovation dynamics in general and for modern telecommunications in 
particular is not possible. If commercial ICT dynamics in the EU are not be fully exploited 
and national governments are unable to reallocate more funds to complementary higher 
education, the economic and social opportunities of modern ICT will remain unexploited 
in critical areas. The traditionally strong role of public universities in Europe lets one 
expect that even in the university sphere innovative digital opportunities for networked 
education – teaching and learning – will be exploited rather slowly. The mixed US system 
– with many private and public universities eager to develop a new digital profile –is 
apparently better positioned to explore new ICT-related options.  
 
Digital Learning in the Networked Society 
If the Community is interested in stimulating economic growth and economic cohesion, the 
availability of broadband internet access is crucial. The Community might well consider 
defining broadband universal services and leaving member countries responsible for 
organizing efficient provision of such services. For the academic community and the 
business community, Internet 2 – already tested in the US on a large scale in 2006 – will be 
a major innovation which not only means much more rapid transmission of data but also 
facilitates national and international cooperation of research institutes. Universities and 
schools will look different in 2010+, since distance learning and other elements of digital 
teaching will become a natural element of life-long learning (LLL).  
LLL presents four major challenges: 
•  ageing societies coping with adjustment needs, technological progress and 
economic globalization can raise the stock of human capital efficiently by 
including new digital learning features; 
•  as economic globalization brings with it a tendency towards higher labor market 
flexibility and reduced tenure in firms, there is a clear need for governments to 
support retraining and training in firms. With tenure falling in all EU countries, the 
incentive for firms to invest in human capital formation is reduced – to the extent 
that training and retraining generate external effects, and governments should 
provide financial incentives for training and retraining in firms;  
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•  EU member countries show relatively heterogeneous indicators in the field of LLL 
and it is remarkable that Germany and Italy – two core countries of the Euro zone 
– are among the relatively weak performers 
•  LLL will be a particular problem in the context of economic globalization which 
will not only erode the tax base (in particular with respect to corporate taxation), 
but also brings pressure towards more flexibility in the labour market which 
implies – among other things – shorter tenure of workers. In such an environment, 
the incentive for firms to invest in training and retraining is declining over time. 
For example, while it is still slightly above ten years in German industry, some of 
Germany’s leading ICT firms have average tenure of workers of less than five 
years. 
Assuming that there are positive external effects from training and retraining, governments 
should consider subsidizing modern efficient forms of digital learning and teaching. 
Drivers of digital learning is ICT expansion, the initiatives in the European education 
space, the dynamics of the knowledge based society – including the growth of the (digital) 
services sector – and EU framework programme effects. The Bologna process and the 
Copenhagen process bring new impulses for digital learning. At the same time, the 
interaction of innovation, research and development (R&D) as well as the modernization 
of the education system are crucial drivers of digital learning. The modernization of the 
education system is largely driven by the increasing need for life-long learning, the rising 
mobility of people (workers/managers/students/apprentices) and the dynamics in creating 
new learning spaces. If the interaction of these elements is carefully organized, well 
managed and to some extent integrated into market mechanisms, the resulting 
developments would help the EU in meeting the goals of the Lisbon Agenda, reinforce 
single market dynamics, help in reaching EU policy goals and contribute to avoiding a 
digital divide within Europe and possibly also beyond the EU (as the EU is an influential 
actor in many regions of the world – not only in other integration areas such as ASEAN or 
MERCOSUR); the latter would be in the spirit of the WSIS, the World Summit of the 
Information Society meeting held in 2006.  
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Figure 16:  ICT, Innovation and eLearning 




































The internationalization of ICT will continue as falling intra-firm transaction costs 
coincide with an increasing R&D intensity within the ICT sector. Governments in EU 
countries should investment more in R&D support. Given the relative innovation 
differentials within the EU (JUNGMITTAG, 2004), however, the optimum R&D-GDP 
ratio will certainly differ across countries. Special projects and programs related to the ICT 
sector could be useful; this approach is particularly valid if positive external effects from 
ICT innovation projects are relatively large. Encouraging the networking of SMEs in 
knowledge-intensive and science intensive sectors could also be a crucial policy element. 
Given the growth of the global knowledge society it will also be important for regulatory 
policy to encourage the modernization of telecommunications networks. More labor 
market flexibility in many countries of the Eurozone might also be a requirement to fully 
exploit the benefit of the digital economy.  
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Growing internationalization of the ICT sector (including outsourcing) is a natural element 
of structural change and economic growth. There is hardly a reason for sounding an alarm 
bell over a hollowing out of German (or EU15) industry; indeed, there is no simple bazaar 
effect which would be dangerous for economic development and employment. Rather there 
are imported intermediate products in exports goods, but there are also exported 
intermediate products in import goods. 
As regards Eastern European accession countries it would be desirable for national 
governments and collective bargaining actors to find ways to reduce the unemployment 
rates. At the same time, governments would be wise to stimulate both economic 
modernization and innovation. This should include adequate incentives not only for FDI 
inflows but also for developing multinational companies which are able to actively use 
foreign sources of innovation and knowledge abroad. EU structural policies should take 
some of these aspects into consideration in the future. 
Comparing the Eurozone to the US (or ASEAN countries), there might be problems of 
optimum outsourcing as the resistance of trade unions in countries with high 
unemployment rates will impair outsourcing which reduces profitability and hence the 
ability of finance innovation and international marketing campaigns. At the same time one 
should emphasize that for high wage EU15 countries it will naturally become important in 
the medium term to specialize more on services which are less exposed to price 
competition. However, such specialization will indeed require not only flexible 
outsourcing but also higher expenditures on education in order to have a well-educated 
workforce. Here the problems of ageing societies will avert increases in the public 
education budget; ageing societies in Europe might place priority on spending more 
taxpayers’ money on social security, in particular retirement benefits. Globalization at the 
same time means that the average tenure of workers at the firm is decreasing so that the 
incentive for firms to invest in human capital upgrading is on the decline. Thus the EU is 
facing serious risks of losing (relative to the US) two traditional advantages relevant for 
productivity and growth. 
For prosperity, stability and growth, the expansion of ICT will be crucial for the EU in 
the 21
st century. Since EU25 is relatively well positioned in terms of human capital, R&D 
activities and broadband network expansion, the Community will be able to benefit 
strongly from ICT. Moreover, the Community should exploit the new democratic 
opportunities of digital networks and introduce internet-based referenda; this is not to 
suggest the introduction of a spontaneous political snapshot. Rather, both ICT and the 
internet make it possible to indeed pose the same question at least twice (say at the 
beginning and the end of a three-month-period) to the electorate and thereby generate a 
solid political feedback mechanism which could help to combine a more efficient 
government with a new digital invisible hand mechanism in the market place.  
The global expansion of ICT and particularly of the internet is not without risks. In a 
political perspective, the internet creates a global public for certain issues. Conflicts which 
would have remained regional in the 18
th or 19
th century could quickly expand to a global 
scale if the respective issue becomes a priority theme in the internet. Speeches of 
politicians, business leaders or religious leaders that would have received only national 
attention a century ago – being thus imbedded in a well-known cultural context – will 
receive global attention in the future in many cases. With information/words absorbed in a  
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heterogeneous global cultural context, the risks of (intended and unintended) 
misunderstandings are increasing. Thus there is an additional source of conflict with 
respect to a potential clash of civilizations. This calls for more careful communication 
policies on the part of politicians and business leaders as well as religious leaders.  
From an EU perspective, ICT is quite important not only in economic terms but also in 
political terms. The internet – as well as mobile communications – allow for the creation of 
integration in a new manner from below. Digital flexible networking should thus be 
encouraged through not only adequate infrastructure policies in EU countries, but also 
through an active digital integration policy by the Commission and the European Council. 
Making the diversity of the Community more visible and encouraging creative and 
innovative actors from various member countries to flexibly cooperate through modern 
networks should be an essential goal of the EU. Finally, considering the opportunities of 
cooperation among integration areas (e.g., Mercosur, Asean or Nafta), digital global 
networks create new options not only for policymakers but for cooperation among civil 
societies as well.  
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Appendix: Modified Dornbusch-Model (Welfens 2006) 
As regards the logarithmic formulation of aggregate demand (lnY
d) it is not easy to 
reconcile the commonly used formulation (e.g. GÄRTNER, 1997) lnY
d = alnq* + a’lnY + 
a”ln G (the parameters a, a’, a” all are positive) with the standard expression of the uses 
side of GDP: Y = C + I + G + X-q*J where C is consumption, I investment, X exports and 
J imports (τ is the tax rate, v product innovations, * for foreign variable). One may, 
however, consider a consistent setup where C= cY(1-τ), G=γY, I=λY; and λ=λ(lnq*, γ, lnv, 
τ), the net export function is X’ = x’(ln[eP*/P], lnY, lnY*, lnv)Y*; we then will use the 
function lnx’(…). The investment output ratio λ is assumed to be a positive function of the 
real exchange rate as we follow FROOT/STEIN (1991), who argue that in a world with 
imperfect capital markets, foreign firms will find it easier to take over companies in 
country I (host country) since a real depreciation of country I’s currency will increase 
equity capital expressed in terms of the potential host country so that leveraged 
international takeover will become easier; hence we assume that the overall investment-
GDP ratio is a positive function of the real exchange rate eP*/P (or lnq*); the partial 
derivative of λ with respect to lnq* therefore is positive (ψ”>0). With respect to the 
government expenditure-GDP ratio, γ the partial derivative ω is ambiguous (will be 
positive if a rise of γ mainly falls on investment goods), with respect to product 
innovations v the partial derivate is positive (η>0), and with respect to the income tax rate 
it is negative (in absolute term ω’). We also define 1+ω=:ω”. Furthermore, we assume that 
lnx’ is a function of all the four arguments shown in the function x(…). Thus we can write 
a consistent version of the aggregate demand side: 
(2’) Y
d{1- c[1-τ] – γ – λ(lnq*, γ, lnv, τ)}= x’(…)Y* 
Assuming for simplicity that c[1-τ]+γ+λ is rather small so that we can use the 
approximization ln (1+z )≈z, we can rewrite the equation as: 
(2”) lnY
d - c[1-τ] – γ – λ(lnq*, γ, lnv, τ) =  
  ={lnx’(lnq*, lnY, lnY*, lnv)}+ lnY* 
Using linearized functions λ(…), lnx’(…) we can write – with three positive derivatives 
∂lnx’/∂lnq*=:ψ”, ∂lnx’/∂lnY* =:Ω’, ∂lnx’/∂lnv =:η’and ∂lnx’/∂lnY=: -Ω<0 – the equation 
as follows: 
(2”’) lnY
d=  c -cτ + γ + ψ”ln(lne-lnP) +  ωγ + ηlnv  
+ω’τ + {ψ(lne-lnP) –ΩlnY + Ω’lnY* +η’lnv} + lnY*  
This then leads to subsequent equation (2) where ψ’=: ψ”+ψ, η”=η+η’ and Ω*=1+ Ω’; we 
also define 1+ω=:ω”.  
The money market is characterized (with φ denoting the income elasticity of the 




-σ’i which implies for equilibrium lnM = ln P + φlnY – σ’i. 
While money market equilibrium is fairly standard, the subsequent capital market 
equilibrium condition is rather unusual as it modifies the interest rate parity condition by 
taking into account portfolio-theoretical considerations relevant in a setup with foreign 
direct investment – the latter is not considered in the Dornbusch model. Note that an  
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alternative way to express the aggregate demand in a logarithmically-stated function is 
based – with j denoting the import –output ratio (imports J=jY) - on Y
d([1-c-γ-
λ(…)+q*j(lnq*)] =x(lnY, lnq*, lnv*)Y* where we have assumed in the spirit of the gravity 
equation that exports are not only a positive function of real income abroad but of domestic 
real output or actually of lnY as well (in an empirical context the assumption that c+γ+λ-j 
is close to zero is more convincing than assuming that c+γ+λ is close to zero). Some key 
equations in the modified Dornbusch model are: 
(A1) dlnP/dt  =  π’[ψ’ (lne – lne#) – ψ’(lnP-lnP#)]  
(A2)  lne – lne# = (lnP# - lnP)/[θσ’] -(ζ/θ) [ßY#/K# - Y*K#) 
If we assume that the foreign marginal product of capital is equal to the domestic marginal 
product we get: 
(A3) dlnP/dt  =  -  π’(ψ’/σ’θ + ψ’) (lnP - lnP#) =  -α”(lnP - lnP#). 
Here we have simply defined π’(ψ’/σ’θ + ψ’)=  α”; the parameter α” is crucial 
subsequently. The above equation is (setting P#=1) a homogeneous differential equation of 
first order and has the solution 
(A4) lnP(t) = C0 e’ 
–α”t 
This implies (having solved for C0 by considering t=0): 
(A5) lnP(t)= lnP # + (lnP(0) – lnP#) e’ 
–α”t 
Note that 
(A6) lne(t) = lne# +[θσ’]
-1 (lnP# - lnP) e’ 
–α”t 
Thus we can state  
(A7) lne(t) = lne# + (lne(0) – lne#) e’ 
–α”t 
The adjustment speed for the exchange rate variable is therefore the same as for the price 
level. Obviously, the adjustment speed α” is faster the higher π’ and ψ’ are (i.e., the faster 
goods market react to excess demand and the stronger trade and (foreign direct) investment 
react to the real exchange rate). The lower the semi-interest elasticity of the demand for 
money (σ) and the slower the foreign exchange market reacts to divergences between the 
long run equilibrium value and the current exchange rate (parameter θ), the faster the 
adjustment process of the price level towards the equilibrium price level. However, we 
have seen that low parameters θ and σ’ imply a large overshooting in case of a monetary 
supply shock so that these two parameters are ambivalent. If they are low, the overshooting 
effect will be large, but adjustment to the new equilibrium value will be fast. Foreign direct 
investment raises the adjustment speed.  
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